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THE PERIPATETIC DEBTOR:
CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF EXEMPTIONS
Laura B. Bartell*
We live in a mobile society. Every year, more than fourteen million U.S.
residents move.' Of these, about nineteen percent migrate to a different state,
2up from only sixteen percent in 1994. When a citizen of one state moves to
another, he or she becomes subject to the laws of the new state to the same
extent as one who has resided in the new jurisdiction all of his or her life. This
general principle, however, is not necessarily applicable to the new state's
exemptions laws if the relocating person becomes a debtor in bankruptcy.
Under § 522(b)(3)(A) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), if the debtor has
not been domiciled in the same state for the 730 days immediately preceding
the filing date of the bankruptcy petition, the new state's exemption laws may
not apply to the debtor.3 Instead, Congress has directed the applicable
exemptions for those recently relocated debtors who may or must be governed
by state (as opposed to federal) exemptions4 are the exemptions established by
the law of their former domicile rather than their new one.
5
But what happens when the state whose exemption laws apply according to
the Code either (1) embraces choice of law principles that would make its
exemption laws inapplicable to the foreign debtor or (2) has substantive
limitations in its exemption laws that preclude the foreign debtor from taking
advantage of them (a situation that has been described as "functionally
Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-549, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002 TO 2003, POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf.
2 Id. at 2-3.
I1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2000).
4 Under § 522(b)(1) of the Code, an individual debtor is permitted to exempt property specified in
§ 522(d) or, alternatively, in federal law other than § 522(d) or in state or local law applicable to the debtor.
Id. § 522(b)(1). Each state may by law deny those debtors to whom its exemptions are applicable the option of
selecting the federal exemptions in § 522(d). Id. § 522(b)(2).
5 The applicable exemptions are those provided by state or local law applicable at the place in which the
debtor's domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion
of such 180-day period. Id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
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restrictive substantive rules" 6)? Did Congress intend to allow a state to reject
application of its exemptions to the foreign debtor?
In Part I of this Article I will explore at the development of the exemption
provision in federal bankruptcy law and the policy underlying the federal/state
law dichotomy. In Part II, I will review traditional choice of law doctrine with
respect to the selection of applicable law in inter-state disputes. Part III
examines the efforts of federal bankruptcy courts to handle the choice of law
problems created by § 522(b)(3) of the Code and suggests that applying
general choice of law principles would steer them towards interpreting federal
bankruptcy law, rather than state law, to resolve the issues. In the final Part, I
discuss how the language of § 522(b) supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to incorporate state exemption laws without any substantive
limitations on their applicability. I further suggest Congress has failed to
resolve the issue adequately in the 2005 amendments to the Code, 7 even if
Congress intended to ignore traditional choice of law principles that would
permit it to override limitations on the applicability of that state law.
I. CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF EXEMPTIONS
Excluding some property from the reach of creditors historically has been
justified on two principal grounds. 8 First, it has been seen as a way of ensuring
6 Robert A. Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 27, 30 (1976). Professor Sedler describes such rules as rules that contain "limitations on the applicability
of a rule of substantive law that inhere within the substantive rule itself." Id. at 32.
7 The 2005 amendments were made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
8 It has been suggested the adoption of the first exemption law in the United States by Texas in 1839,
before it became a part of the United States in 1845, was motivated by the desire to attract settlers who might
be interested in protection from creditors. See Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property
Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 23 (2004) (citing Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead
Exemptions in the United States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80 J.
AM. HIST. 470, 477 (1993)). Advertisements aimed at prospective settlers highlighted the new exemption
laws. See Goodman, supra, at 477.
One commentator has identified five policies that influenced the development of exemption law:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his physical survival;
(2) To protect the dignity and the cultural and religious identity of the debtor;
(3) To enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in the future;
(4) To protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of impoverishment;
(5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor and his family with minimal financial support from
society to the debtor's creditors.
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the debtor had property necessary to continue to be a productive member of
society, i.e., financial rehabilitation. 9  Therefore, early exemption laws
protected tools of the trade (those tools and implements necessary for carrying
on a trade or business).' 0 As the economy expanded, exemptions came to
represent a broader humanitarian goal of protecting debtors and their
dependents from destitution." Of course, there was an economic justification
for this goal as well. Those residents who were completely without resources
would require financial assistance from the state. 12  By preventing creditors
from taking all available property from the debtor, exemptions shifted the cost
of maintaining the debtor from the state onto the creditors.
13
The earliest U.S. bankruptcy laws, the Acts of 180014 and 1841,15 contained
their own lists of limited uniform bankruptcy exemptions. State law
Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or
Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 621 (1978).
9 See, e.g., Douglas E. Deutsch, Exemption Reform: Examining the Proposals, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 207, 207 (1995); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on Exemption
Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 275, 279 (2000); Jean McGreevy, Proposed Reforms in Iowa Bankruptcy
Exemption Laws: A Solution to the Fraudulent Conveyance Dilemma, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1989);
William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 787 (1974); William T. Vukowich,
Debtor's Exemption Rights under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769, 771 (1980); William J.
Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 337 (1982).
10 See, e.g., J.T. Hardin, Bankruptcy Planning: Risks of Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt
Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 279, 281 (1987); G. Stanley Joslin, Debtors'
Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 365-68 (1959); Marjorie Dick Rombauer,
Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV. 484, 485 (1961).
1 See, e.g., McGreevy, supra note 9, at 1234; Woodword, supra note 9, at 338.
12 See, e.g., Lee Robert Bogdanoff, Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Code: Using California's New
Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 922, 924 (1984); Matthew J. Kemner, Personal
Bankruptcy Discharge and the Myth of the Unchecked Homestead Exemption, 56 MO. L. REV. 683, 684-85
(1991); Raymond C. Marier, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 663, 665 (1968).
13 See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 9, at 207-08; Engledow, supra note 9, at 279; McGreevy, supra note 9,
at 1234.
14 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
United States). This statute provided only for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against merchants. Id. at
20-21. The only exempt property was the bankrupt's necessary wearing apparel, beds and bedding, and the
necessary wearing apparel of his wife and children. Id. at 23. The bankrupt was also allowed a set percentage
of the assets recovered for creditors, depending on the size of the distribution. Id. at 30.
15 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
United States). This Act was the first to allow voluntary bankruptcy and covered all debtors, not merely
merchants. Id. at 441-42. Exempt property consisted of necessary household and kitchen furniture along with
other articles and necessaries of the bankrupt, as well as the wearing apparel of the bankrupt, his wife, and
children-taking into account the family, condition, and circumstances of the bankrupt-that did not exceed
$300 in value in the aggregate. Id. at 443.
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exemptions were not recognized. 16 The Act of 1867,17 which was repealed in
1878, also included federal exemptions for apparel of the bankrupt, his wife,
and children, as well as household and kitchen furniture and other articles and
necessaries not exceeding $500 in value. 18 The Act of 1867, however, took a
new approach allowing the bankrupt to exempt any other property specified
under the state exemption laws of the bankrupt's domicile at the time of the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings in an amount not exceeding the
amount allowed under those laws as in effect in 1864.19
The first permanent U.S. bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
went even further, eliminating federal exemptions entirely.2 ° Instead, section 6
of the Act explicitly stated:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the
exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the
time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had
their domicile for the six months or the greater portion thereof
immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
The approach was controversial. In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,22 the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the contention that, in failing to provide uniform
federal exemptions, Congress had acted beyond its power to enact a "uniform"
system of bankruptcy law under the Bankruptcy Clause to the U.S.
Constitution ("Bankruptcy Clause").23 The Court concluded creditors were not
harmed because they "contracted with reference to the rights of the parties
,,24thereto under existing [state] exemption laws, and the uniformity required
by the Constitution was "geographical, and not personal. ' '25 Thus, the decision
of Congress to incorporate state exemption law was found constitutionally
permissible because it uniformly gave all creditors access to exactly that
16 See 2 Stat. at 23; 5 Stat. at 443.
17 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
United States).
18 Id. at 522-23. It also exempted the uniform, arms, and equipments of soldiers. Id. at 523.
19 Id.
20 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified at II U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)) (repealed
1978).
21 Id.§ 24.
22 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24 186 U.S. at 189.
25 Id. at 188.
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property they could have reached outside of bankruptcy. 26 When the Act was
amended in 1938, section 6 was amended only slightly and did not change the
deference to state law.
27
Many commentators criticized the incorporation of state exemption laws
into the federal bankruptcy case,28 noting state law exemptions were not
enacted with bankruptcy liquidation in mind;29 were in many cases so
antiquated as to conflict with the fresh start policy of federal bankruptcy
laws;30 and were nonuniform, providing dramatically different treatment of
debtors who lived in different states but were similar in all other respects.
31
Their arguments proved persuasive to the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States ("Commission"), which recommended in its 1973
Report that uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions be adopted.32  As the
Commission stated, "[b]y eliminating the reference to nonbankruptcy law
much litigation and considerable inequity due to state procedural requirements
26 Id. at 189-90.
27 Section 6 was amended to read as follows:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the
laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the
State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in any other State: Provided, however,
That [sic] no such allowance shall be made out of the property which a bankrupt transferred or
concealed and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act for the benefit
of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by way of security only and the
property recovered is in excess of the amount secured thereby, such allowance may be made out of
such excess.
52 Stat. 847, codified at II U.S.C. § 24 (1938).
28 See, e.g., Vein Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678,
681 (1960); Marier, supra note 12, at 682; William T. Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposals
Regarding Bankrupts' Exemption Rights, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1441-46 (1975).
29 This is no longer true. Several states have enacted exemption statutes that operate only in a
bankruptcy case. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-218 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100 (2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.160 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5451 (West 2005); N.Y. DEB. &
CRED. LAW §§ 282-283 (Gould 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2006); W. VA.
CODE § 38-10-4 (2005). See generally Joseph Lamport, Note, The Preemption of Bankruptcy-Only
Exemptions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 583 (1985).
30 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 28, at 681 (describing "extreme obsolescence" of state exemption
laws); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1465 (1959) (exemptions
"[piresumably useful in a rural society [and] have little relevance today"); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
126 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087 ("Most [state exemption laws] are outmoded,
designed for more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for
modem urban debtors.").
31 See Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 30, at 1468-69.
32 See EXEcUTIVE DIR., COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt 2, at 125-30 (1973).
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are avoided. Questions as to the applicable law, its scope, and whether a law
provides an exemption within the meaning of section 6 of the Act are
mooted. 33
An alternative approach advocated by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges became the basis of a bankruptcy bill in the House of
Representatives. The bill provided federal exemptions, but would have
allowed debtors to elect either the federal exemptions or those provided by the
state of the debtor's domicile.
35
The law as enacted rejected the Commission's approach, which proved
politically unpalatable, and adopted a last minute compromise 36 between the
exemption scheme proposed by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
(endorsed by the House 37) and the limitation to state exemption law contained
in the Bankruptcy Act (proposed by the Senate38). Although Congress
included federal exemptions in the new Code and provided the debtor the
option to elect the federal exemptions or the applicable state exemptions as the
House bill had provided, Congress inserted a new provision consistent with the
Senate bill that permitted each state to enact a law making the federal
exemptions unavailable to its residents. 39  As a result, under current
§ 522(b)(2) of the Code, the debtor has a choice between federal and state
exemptions unless the applicable state law "specifically does not so
authorize' '4° the so-called "opt-out" provision.41  The opt-out provision has
" Id. at 128.
14 H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 30,970 (1974).
" Id. at § 4-503(b).
36 See 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (1978) (Remarks of Rep. Edwards).
17 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REc. 35,644 (1977). The bill proposed to allow the debtor to
exempt either:
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section [5221; or in the alternative,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal, State, or local law, other than subsection (d) of
this section, that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the
debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place...
Id. at 35,654.
38 S. 2266, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REc. 36,091 (1977).
39 In remarks on the floor of the Senate, Senator Wallop characterized the compromise as "an important
victory for the rights of States to determine exemptions for the debtors of their States." 124 CONG. REC.
33,992 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop). Sen. Wallop was concerned about protecting debtors who lived in
states, like his own state of Wyoming, that granted exemptions more generous than those provided under
§ 522(d). Id.
40 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2000).
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attracted substantial academic criticism,42  and uniform federal exemptions
were proposed once again by the Commission in its 1997 Report.43 However,
the political realities that doomed the same proposal when made by the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1973 killed the
1997 proposal as well;44  the opt-out provision remained in the 2005
amendments to the Code.45
Because the opt-out clause was drafted quickly,46 it provides no guidance
on the scope of the state's power to regulate with respect to exemptions when
the state has exercised its right to confine its residents to those exemptions.
The language of the statute does not tell us what Congress meant when it
provided that exempt property is "any property that is exempt under ... State
or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.' ' 7 To
41 It is not clear who coined the term "opt-out" to describe the flexibility given to the states by § 522(b),
but the term begins to appear in published bankruptcy cases in 1980. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823,
824 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Estridge, 7 B.R. 873, 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Cottingim, 7 B.R. 56,
57 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317, 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); Bass v. Thacker (In re
Thacker), 5 B.R. 592, 594 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); Coleman v. Lake Air Bank (In re Coleman), 5 B.R. 76, 79
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Bloom, 5 B.R. 451, 452 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Hill, 4 B.R. 310, 313
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Smothers, 3 B.R. 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Thompson, 2 B.R. 380,
381 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Stephens, 2 B.R. 365, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Philip
Shuchman & Thomas L. Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings and Other Purposes, 56
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1982).
42 See, e.g., William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations:
The "Opt-Out" as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149 (1997); Engledow,
supra note 9; James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry
State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1983); Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 27 (1983); Richard E.
Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851 (1999); Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption
Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1997); Woodward, supra note 9; cf. G. Marcus
Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (2000) (suggesting a
"transactional nexus" requirement for choice of law would be preferable to a uniform federal set of
exemptions).
43 See NAT'L BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, Recommendation
1.2.1 (1997).
44 See generally Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 47, 123 (1997) (attributing resistance to uniform federal exemptions to "devolution of power from the
federal government to the states"); Cole, supra note 42, at 250 (arguing federalization of bankruptcy
exemptions would undermine federalist structure of the bankruptcy system).
45 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)
46 The 95th Congress was set for adjournment on Oct. 14, 1978. Differences between the House and
Senate bills were resolved without formal conference only days before adjournment, delayed by the
controversy over the constitutional status of bankruptcy judges. The bill was passed on Oct. 6, 1978. See
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 954-56 (1979).
The opt-out clause has been called "unconsidered" by Congress. See Haines, supra note 42, at 6.
41 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
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interpret this phrase (and the issue is one of statutory interpretation), we must
look to general choice of law principles for guidance.
II. CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES
There are many situations in modem life when the facts giving rise to
litigation could lead to the application of the laws of more than one
jurisdiction. The constitutional constraints on the applicability of a particular
state's laws are limited. The state whose substantive law is applied to the
dispute "must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.,
48
For a debtor who has moved within the 730 days prior to bankruptcy, either
the state in which he or she is currently residing or the state from which he or
she moved could be seen as having the requisite state interest in applying its
exemption laws to the debtor's bankruptcy. The state in which the debtor is
newly settled has an interest in ensuring its residents retain the property
specified in its exemption statutes as they emerge from bankruptcy so they will
not require state assistance and can become productive citizens who will
contribute to the state's economy.49 The state from which the debtor moved
has an interest in protecting the expectations of creditors who dealt with the
debtor while he or she resided there by limiting the debtor's exempt property to
that provided by the state's laws.5 °
The conflict of laws principles applicable to exemptions outside of
bankruptcy are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
section 132 (197 1).51 Under that section:
The local law of the forum determines what property of a debtor
within the state is exempt from execution unless another state, by
reason of such circumstances as the domicil [sic] of the creditor and
the debtor within its territory, has the dominant interest in the
48 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
49 See, e.g., In re O'Hara, 162 F. 325, 327 (M.D. Pa. 1908).
50 See, e.g., Bassin v. Stopher (In re Bassin), 637 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Morzella, 171 B.R.
485,488 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994); In re Sticha, 60 BR. 717, 719 (Bankr. D. Mn. 1986).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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question of exemption. In that event, the local law of the other state
will be applied.
52
Comment (b) to section 132 notes that under the then-applicable Bankruptcy
Act,53 "the local law of the State of the debtor's domicil [sic] governs
exemptions."
54
Section 522(b)(3)(A) continues to make the law of the debtor's domicile
(or former domicile) the applicable law for exemptions. 55 The Restatement
choice of law rule on applicable exemption law 56 is preempted in bankruptcy;
the law of the domicile (or former domicile) of the debtor, as specified in the
Code, provides the applicable exemption law regardless of the "dominant
interest" of any other state that might prevail in the choice of law analysis
outside of bankruptcy.
57
That Congress designated which of the two interested states supplies the
law relating to bankruptcy exemptions, however, does not complete the choice
of law analysis. The language of § 522(b)(3)(A) refers to property that is
exempt under "State or local law" applicable on the date of filing at the place
of the present or former domicile of the debtor. What did Congress mean by
its invocation of "State or local law" of the applicable domiciliary state?
Although this is an issue of legislative interpretation, general principles used in
interpreting choice of law designation in private agreements inform the
analysis.
Assume the parties to a contract specify an applicable law for a particular
contract provision. If that provision is one for which the parties could have
included explicit language in the agreement that mirrors the substantive
provisions of the selected law, Restatement section 187(1) suggests the choice
52 id.
" 11 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (repealed 1978) provided the Bankruptcy Act "shall not affect the allowance to
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by... the state laws in force at the time of the filing of the
petition in the state wherein they have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition ......
54 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 132 cmt. b
" 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2000).
56 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 132.
57 See, e.g., In re Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479, 493 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (citing § 132 to apply Wyoming
exemption law (domicile of debtors and forum) to household goods in Mexico); cf In re Pederson, 105 B.R.
622, 624-25 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (concluding Colorado, the debtors' domicile, had the "dominant interest"
under § 132, and Colorado exemption law should apply).
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of law provision is valid.58  In such situations, the designation of applicable
law is not really a choice of law provision, but rather merely a shorthand way
of including the substantive provisions the parties wish to include, an
"incorporation by reference."
59
What is the scope of the state law thus incorporated? When parties to a
contract specify the law of a particular state governs the contract, unless they
indicate to the contrary, their designation will be deemed to select the local law
of the applicable state, excluding any choice of law rules that would lead
courts in the chosen state to apply the local law of a different jurisdiction.
60
58 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 187(1); see, e.g., Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 77 P.3d 439, 443
(Ariz. 2003); In re Estate of Brown, 955 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); In re Kenwood Commc'ns
Corp., No. 04-02-0377-CV, 2003 WL 1191409 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2003); Salazar v. Coastal Corp., 928
S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). See generally John Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the
Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws,
58 CORNELL L. REv. 433, 491-92 (1973).
59 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 187 cmt. c. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Contracts
Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 286 (1972).
Whether the parties could have legally included such an explicit provision is determined by the local
law of the state whose law would be applicable in the absence of a valid choice of law designation in the
contract, that is, "the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties." RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 188.
Even if the issue is not one the parties could have resolved by including a specific provision in their
contract, when the parties to a contract specify the law to govern their rights and duties, that chosen law will be
applied unless
the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or ... application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which ... would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
Id. § 187(2); see, e.g., Hughes Elecs. Corp. v. Citibank Del., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004);
Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 506 A.2d 817, 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Jones
v. Eastwood Leasing Corp., No. 11304, 1989 WL 66242, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Chesapeake Operating,
Inc. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); In re Kenwood Consmnc'ns, 2003
WL 1191409, at *3; McGill v. Hill, 644 P.2d 680, 683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). Most contractual provisions
are ones the parties could have resolved by specific provision, and are thus subject to the rle of Restatement
section 187(1) rather than section 187(2). See generally Prebble, supra note 58, at 492.
60 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 187(3). See, e.g., Hughes Elecs. Corp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 250;
Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38; U.S. West Mktg. Res. Co. v. Mobile Media, Inc.,
No. C6-94-644, 1994 WL 550717, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1994); Chestnut v. Pediatric Homecare of
Am., Inc., 617 A.2d 347, 350-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Jones, 1989 WL 66242 at *3; Winer Motors, Inc., 506
A.2d at 821; McGill, 644 P.2d at 683; First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou, 270 N.W.2d 582, 585
(Wis. Ct. App. 1978). But see Winer Motors, Inc., 506 A.2d at 821 (applying the law of Connecticut, which




"Local law" of a state is defined as "the body of standards, principles and
rules, exclusive of its rules of Conflict of Laws, which the courts of that state
apply in the decision of controversies brought before them.' Comment (b) to
Restatement section 132, in interpreting the exemption provision of the
Bankruptcy Act (which referred simply to "state laws") to make applicable the
"local law" of the applicable state, supports this interpretation.
What if the state does not want its law to be selected? That is, what if the
substantive provisions of the designated state's law (as opposed to state choice
of law principles) would render the state substantive law inapplicable to the
parties or transaction with respect to which it has been chosen because they
lack a sufficient domestic nexus? When parties to a private contract have made
a valid choice of law under the principles of Restatement section 187, even
when the applicable state law on its face seems to limit its application to
wholly domestic transactions, a court may appropriately decline to interpret the
limiting language of section 187 as precluding the statute's applicability to a
foreign transaction.
62
For example, in First Wisconsin National Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou, the
parties signed a security agreement providing enforcement was to be
"governed by the Internal laws of Wisconsin.' '63  The secured party
repossessed the collateral in California using self-help, which was appropriate
under California law, but the debtor claimed the actions violated Wisconsin
law. 64 The court first refused to apply a Wisconsin statute that would have
made applicable the law of the state where the collateral was located at the
time of the repossession because it was not part of the "internal" law of
Wisconsin.65  The court then examined another Wisconsin statute that
generally precluded merchants from taking possession of collateral "in this
state" other than by legal process. 66 The secured party contended that the
statute by its terms applied only to repossessions occurring in Wisconsin.
67
Because the state legislature had no power or jurisdiction to regulate conduct
outside its borders, the court rejected this interpretation finding the words "in
this state" imposed no additional geographic limitation on the scope of the
61 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 4.
62 See First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Madison, 270 N.W.2d at 585.
63 Id. at 584.
64 id.
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statute. 68 Therefore, when the parties invoked Wisconsin law in their contract,
they did not make the statute applicable to California repossessions, but agreed
to abide by the restrictions in Wisconsin law (notwithstanding its jurisdictional
limitations) even if they conducted the repossession outside the boundaries of
Wisconsin.
69
Indeed, despite the large number of cases declining to apply the designated
state law when the state law itself limits its applicability to residents or local
businesses (particularly in the franchise context)70 on the theory that the state
law was not intended to have extraterritorial effect, litigants have persuasively
argued that this conclusion is an erroneous application of choice of law
principles. 71  The issue of whether the parties are bound by the limitations
imposed by a particular state's laws should be a question of contract
interpretation, not state legislative intent.7 2 The state legislature never intends
to enact laws having extraterritorial impact because it has no jurisdiction to do
SO. 73 The designation of the law of a particular state by private parties does not
68 id.
69 id. at 586.
70 See, e.g., Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 386 (7th Cir. 2003); JRT, Inc.
v. TCBY Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 1995); Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar Inc., 908 F.2d 60, 63-
64 (6th Cir. 1990); Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 358 (4th Cir. 1989);
Bimel-Walroth Co. v. Raytheon Co., 796 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1986); McDonald's Corp. v. C.B. Mgmt. Co.,
13 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Montgomery Ward Catalog Sales Litig., 680 F. Supp. 182, 186
(E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 856 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1988); Premier Wine & Spirits of S.D. Inc. v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431, 1439 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988);
Gilchrist Mach. Co. v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1192, 1201 (S.D. Miss. 1984); Bunch v. Artec Int'l
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 968 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Diesel Injection Serv. Co. v. Jacobs Vehicle Equip. Co.,
31 Conn. L. Rptr. 741 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002); cf Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1022-23
& n.24 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding no clear intent in Florida Franchise Act to limit its applicability to Florida
residents, but stating if the legislature had explicitly limited its scope the contract could not "be used to
override the clear intention of the legislature").
71 See George F. Carpinello, Testing the Limits of Choice of Law Clauses: Franchise Contracts as a Case
Study, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 57, 78-79 (1990) ("Although a state's franchisee protection law may apply, by its
terms, only to franchisees within that state, when the franchisor agrees to be bound by the whole body of that
state's law, it agrees that such protective legislation will apply to the subject relationship.").
72 See C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 557 F.2d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir. 1977)
("Obviously, the legislature passed the law to protect [resident] dealers.... [b]ut that does not mean that
parties, one or both of which have some reasonable contact with the State [], may not agree to clothe
themselves with the rights and duties of citizens of that state when determining their respective rights under
their contract."); Infomax Office Sys., Inc. v. MBO Binder & Co., 976 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
(in choosing governing law, "parties... clearly intended for courts applying this law to act as if the parties
were within the ambit of Illinois law," despite the lack of the chosen state's interest in applying its law).
73 See Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ("Legislation is presumptively territorial and
confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction.").
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give the chosen law extraterritorial effect.74 A court enforcing the governing
law provision does not render the selected state law applicable on an
extraterritorial basis.75 Rather, it merely enforces the contractual provision that
incorporates state law because that was the intent of the parties.
76
Similarly, choice of law decisions suggest the intrinsic limitations in the
substantive law of the state designated by § 522(b)(3)(A) are not necessarily
binding in a federal bankruptcy case.77  The question is whether Congress
intended to incorporate not only the state law exemptions, but the state law
limitations on the applicability of those exemptions as well. The courts
generally have not only failed to answer that question, but have generally
failed to recognize federal legislative intent is relevant at all.
III. APPLYING CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES TO BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS FOR
NONRESIDENT DEBTORS
Despite the existence of these conflict of law precepts, most courts have
failed to apply them to the issue of bankruptcy exemptions. Instead, courts
have analyzed whether the exemption laws of the state whose laws are made
applicable by the operation of § 522(b)(3) can be given extraterritorial effect as
a matter of state law.
74 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
75 But cf. Thomas M. Pitegoff, Choice of Law in Franchise Relationships: Staying Within Bounds, 14
FRANCHISE L.J. 89, 117-18 (1995) (arguing choice of law should be limited by territorial constraints unless the
parties clearly indicate a desire for extraterritorial application of the chosen state law).
76 See Infonax Office Sys., 976 F. Supp. at 1254 ("enforcing the parties' choice of law does not in any
way give 'extraterritorial' effect to the laws of Illinois: the contract, not the law of Illinois, is enforced in
Iowa."); see also Carpinello, supra note 71, at 79 ("In essence, section 187 allows the parties, subject to the
limitations set forth in paragraph 2, to place themselves within the ambit of [the selected governing] law [even
when the legislature passing the chosen law only insisted upon its application within that state].").
The impact of a contractual choice of applicable law should be contrasted in this context with
situations in which the applicable law is selected by the forum court based on general choice of law principles.
In these latter cases, when the applicable local law selected by the forum court explicitly limits its operation to
residents or domiciliaries, or when it applies by its terms only to property located within the state, most forum
courts conclude extending its applicability to those persons or property not within its language is
impermissible because it would give the applicable law "extraterritorial effect." See, e.g., Hoff Supply Co. v.
Allen-Bradley Co., 750 F. Supp. 176, 178 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Mahl v. Aaron, 809 N.E.2d 953, 957 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004) (quoting DeLotel v. DeLotel, 24, 140 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)); Prater v. Prater, 9 S.W.
361, 363 (Tenn. 1888). But when the parties bind themselves by contract to abide by the law of a state that
might otherwise not have jurisdiction over a transaction, their intent should be effectuated.
71 See infra Part III.
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The answer to that question is generally no. State courts have been almost
uniformly reluctant to extend the reach of their state exemptions to
78 79
nonresidents,78  or to property not within their boundaries. When state
domiciliaries file for bankruptcy, those domiciliaries have been unable to
protect foreign property. 80  Therefore, when state law explicitly limits the
operation of its exemption laws to domiciliaries, residents, or property within
the state's boundaries, some courts have applied those limitations even when
§ 522(b)(3) directs that state law be applicable to the foreign debtor without
property in the state.
8 1
When state law does not contain express limitations, bankruptcy courts
have been more willing to read the state exemptions expansively to cover the
debtor's property outside of the state in order to effectuate the intent of
Congress in the Code. In the leading case of Arrol v. Broach (In re Arrol),82
the court allowed a debtor who had moved from California to Michigan shortly
before bankruptcy to claim the California homestead exemption for the
debtor's Michigan property, noting the California exemption statute did not
78 See, e.g., DeLotel, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55; Ferneau v. Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1957); Prater, 9 S.W. at 363. But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078,
1987 (10th Cir. 1994) (allowing a Texas resident to claim Colorado exemptions for funds in Colorado bank
account); Bond v. Turner, 54 P. 158 (Or. 1898) (extending benefit of Oregon exemption law to nonresident);
Bergman v. Bergman, 888 S.W. 2d 580, 585-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Applying Restatement section 132 to
allow a nonresident to protect retirement benefits paid by Texas company from garnishment under Texas
exemption statute).
79 See, e.g., Rogers v. Raisor, 14 N.W. 317 (Iowa 1882); State Bank of Eagle Grove v. Dougherty, 66
S.W. 932 (Mo. 1902); Rider v. Rider, 887 S.W. 2d 255, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Wm. Cameron & Co. v.
Abbott, 258 S.W. 562, 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See generally 40 AM JUR. 2d Homestead § 14 (2005)
("Homestead statutes have no extraterritorial force and must be construed to apply solely to homesteads within
the state."). But see Miller-Watt v. Miller-Watt, No. C-79093F, 1981 WL 9638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18,
1981) (applying Ohio exemption law to garnishment of wages of Texas resident).
80 See, e.g., Palais v. DeJarnette (In re Scharton's Estate), 145 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir. 1944) (denying
Massachusetts resident Virginia homestead exemption for Virginia property; applicability of Massachusetts
homestead exemption not raised); In re Owings, 140 F. 739, 741 (E.D.N.C. 1905) (denying North Carolina
resident homestead exemption for property in Maryland); In re Peters, 91 B.R. 401,403-04 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988) (denying Texas resident homestead exemption in property located in Brazil); In re Schmidt, No. 1-86-
01102, 1987 WL 40053, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1987) (denying Texas resident homestead exemption
for proceeds of Iowa house); cf In re Calhoun, 47 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (noting although
debtor had to be a resident to take advantage of Virginia exemptions, debtor-resident could have applied
Virginia homestead exemption to non-Virginia homestead property if he had complied with Virginia law on
filing homestead deed).
81 See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 15 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (denying D.C. resident Virginia
exemptions despite applicability of Virginia exemptions under § 522(b)).
82 170 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1999).
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explicitly limit the homestead exemption to property in California. 83  Courts
84 8have reached the same conclusion with respect to Arizona, Georgia,85
Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin" exemption
statutes.9 1  In other cases, no party asserted that territorial limitations on
exemptions preclude their applicability, and the bankruptcy court simply
applied the exemption law of the state indicated by § 522(b) to property
outside its borders.92  Even where state law contains no explicit limitations,
some bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to give state exemption law
extraterritorial force by allowing that law to shield out-of-state property when
the Code makes the state's laws applicable to the debtor.
93
This analysis is flawed because the question as stated-whether the
applicable state would give extraterritorial reach to its own exemption laws-is
not the correct inquiry. The Code is a federal statute, by referring to property
designated as exempt under the state law applicable under the language of
§ 522(b)(3)(A), it renders state law applicable. It is Congress, not the state
legislature, that has given the state statute "extraterritorial" effect. 94 Congress
has designated a "governing law" for exemptions that would not be applied by
normal territorial principles of domicile of the debtor at the time of filing.
95
The appropriate question is how to interpret the federal law selecting that state
83 Id. at 936; cf. In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 787 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (suggesting if California
exemptions were applicable, they could apply to Arizona homestead).
84 See In re Jarski, 301 B.R. 342, 346 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (dictum).
85 See In re Stockburger, 192 B.R. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished).
86 See In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611,614-15 (8th Cir. 2005).
87 See In re Woodruff, No. 04-63288,2005 WL 1139891, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 28,2005).
88 See In re Stratton, 269 B.R. 716, 718 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001).
89 See In re Calhoun, 47 B.R. 119, 122-23.
90 See In re Stevens, 23 F. 2, 3 (W.D. Wis. 1870).
91 But cf. In re Weza, 248 B.R. 470, 473 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (holding although New Hampshire
homestead exemption may be applicable to foreign property, it is not applicable unless debtor resides at the
property).
92 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 62 B.R. 43, 46 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding Tennessee exemptions applicable
"regardless of where the property is situated"); In re Tanzi, 287 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2002),
affid, 297 B.R. 607 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (finding either Washington or California exemption law applicable
to Florida homestead); In re Andrews, 225 B.R. 485 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998) (applying Idaho exemption law to
property of Washington resident who filed jointly with Idaho wife in Idaho).
93 See, e.g., In re Sipka, 149 B.R. 181, 182-83 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Nelms, No. 04-53521, 2005 WL
318802, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2005); In re Ginther, 282 B.R. 16, 19-21 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002); In
re Halpin, No. 93-03215, 1994 WL 594199, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 1, 1994).
94 See Countryman, supra note 28, at 697-98.
95 Generally, one would expect a debtor to be governed by exemption laws of the state where he or she is
domiciled to the same extent as the debtor is subject to all other laws of that state.
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governing law, not how to interpret the state law so chosen. That interpretive
effort is aided by resort to the choice of law principles discussed above.
Even when courts have applied general conflicts rules to determine the
applicability of state exemption laws, they fail to recognize the impact of those
rules on any limitations imposed by state laws. For example, in In re Drenttel
the Eighth Circuit concluded that Minnesota's homestead exemption could be
applied to protect the residence recently acquired by the debtors in Arizona.
96
The bankruptcy trustee contended that, by making Minnesota law applicable
for exemption purposes, Congress intended all of Minnesota law on that issue
be examined, including Minnesota conflict of laws principles. 97 The trustee
maintained that a Minnesota court would not apply Minnesota law to a
homestead outside of the state.98 But the court--consistent with the approach
of Restatement section 4 (which it never cited)--concluded Congress intended
only the local exemption law of Minnesota to be applicable, not its choice of
law rules. 99 To interpret § 522(b)(3) as including choice of law rules, the court
noted, could result in the designated state applying the law of the state to which
the debtors had just moved (in this case, Arizona), a sort of renvoi Congress
clearly intended to preclude.
100
The court's analysis up to this point was completely consistent with basic
conflicts principles. Rather than stop there and apply Minnesota law, however,
the court went on to look at the "language" of the Minnesota exemption statute
to see if the homestead exemption "can be applied" to an Arizona homestead
as a matter of state law. 10 1 With this analysis, it returned to the flawed
question of whether a particular state's exemptions can be given extraterritorial
effect. Although the court concluded Minnesota's exemption statute could be
read to protect an Arizona homestead, 10 2 it was wrong from a jurisdictional
stand-point. A state has no power to provide protection from execution to
property not within its boundaries; state exemption law cannot be given
extraterritorial effect as a matter of state law, and cases have consistently so
held. 103
96 403 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2005).
9' Id. at 613.
98 id.
99 Id. at614 .
100 Id. at 614 n.3.
101 Id. at 614-15.
102 ld. at 615.
103 See, e.g., DeLotel v. DeLotel (In re Marriage of DeLotel), 140 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977); Garrett v. Garrett, 490 P.2d 313, 315 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Mahl v. Aaron, 809 N.E.2d 953, 957 (Ind.
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But if Code § 522(b)(3) gives state exemption laws extraterritorial effect, it
does so as a matter of federal law. It incorporates by reference the applicable
exemption scheme of a particular state (a state determined by the 730-day/180-
day formula). As noted by the Sixth Circuit in In re Stockburger, concerns
regarding the extraterritorial effect of state law are "misplaced." 104 When state
law is incorporated into § 522(b), "state law [becomes] part of the federal
statutory scheme; so it is federal law being given effect, not state law."
10 5
The federal statute can be analyzed as if it were a contractual choice of law
provision, albeit one that is not consensual on the nongovernmental party to the
contract. Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause to preempt state
exemption laws for bankruptcy cases, so its designation of applicable state
exemption law is equally binding on the debtor and the states that might
otherwise have an interest. However, even if Congress was not empowered by
the Constitution to specify applicable exemption law, under Restatement
section 187(1) a contractual choice of law should be honored to the extent the
choice is one that could have been addressed directly in the contract. Because
the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to list specific exemptions
that a debtor may claim in bankruptcy, by analogy, its decision to incorporate
by reference state exemptions would be equally enforceable.
Under Restatement section 187(3), unless Congress explicitly indicated to
the contrary (which it did not), the applicable state law incorporated into Code
§ 522(b)(3)(A) is deemed to be the substantive exemption law of the applicable
state without regard to conflicts of law principles applied by that state that
might render the substantive law inapplicable to the foreign debtor. Such an
interpretation is compelled by inclusion of the 730-day limit in § 522(b)(3)(A).
Assume a debtor has lived in State A (which has very limited exemptions)
for many years, but moves to State B (which has more generous exemptions).
Within 730 days thereafter, debtor files for bankruptcy. Section 522(b)(3)(A)
states the debtor's exempt property is "any property that is exempt under...
Ct. App. 2004); Ferneau v. Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d 161,167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Goodwin v. Claytor, 49
S.E. 173, 174 (N.C. 1904); State ex rel. Lankford v. Collins, 174 P. 568, 570 (Okla. 1918); Carson v. Memphis
& C.R. Co., 13 S.W. 588, 589 (Tenn. 1890); Bergman v. Bergman, 888 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. App. 1994);
Strawn Mercantile Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Strawn, 279 S.W. 473, 474 (Tex. App. 1925); Wm. Cameron &
Co. v. Abbott, 258 S.W. 562, 564 (Tex. App. 1924); S. Pac. Co. v. I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment
House, 140 P. 665,666 (Utah 1914).
104 Farinash v. Stockburger (In re Stockburger), 106 F.3d 402 (Table), No. 96-5409, 1997 WL 41202, at
*2 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
105 id.
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State or local law that is applicable ... at the place in which the debtor's
domicile... was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day
period [immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition]." In our
example, this place is State A.
Assume under State A's choice of law principles, the courts of State A
would apply State B's exemption laws to the debtor because they would find
State B has dominant interest in the issue as described in Restatement section
132. If the invocation of "State law" in § 522(b)(3)(A) were interpreted to
include State A's choice of law principles, the bankruptcy court would be
required to give effect to the exemptions specified under the laws of State B,
just as a court in State A would do. In permitting such a renvoi, the
bankruptcy court would defeat the Congressional intent of preventing a debtor
from "shopping" for more favorable exemption laws by moving within 730
days of bankruptcy. 106 Congress could not have intended its designation of
"State law" to include choice of law principles that would result in the
application of substantive law of the state to which the debtor has moved.
10 7
The Eighth Circuit was correct in its application of choice of law rules in In re
Drenttel.'o8
Therefore, we must interpret the language of § 522(b)(3)(A) to make
reference to the substantive law of the applicable state, excluding any choice of
law principles that would result in the applicability of a state not selected by
Congress. What is the impact on the debtor, though, if it is not state choice of
law principles that render the designated state law inapplicable, but the
provisions of the state exemption laws themselves? What happens if the
applicable substantive state law is not by its terms applicable to the debtor
because it is available only to debtors who live in the state or to property
within its borders?
The Congressional decision to incorporate by reference state exemption
law answers this question as well. Even if the applicable state law has internal
106 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 42, at 231.
107 This principle was ignored in In re Neims where the court assumed that when § 522(b)(2) directed
application of Michigan law, it also required the application of Michigan conflict of laws rules that would look
to the situs of real property to determine its exempt status. No. 04-53521, 2005 WL 318802 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Feb. 4, 2005). The court viewed the impact of the Michigan choice of law rules as creating the
equivalent to a territorial limitation on the real property exemption laws of Michigan, a conclusion that is not
be justified by § 522(b)(2).
108 403 F.3d 611,614 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Arrol v. Broach (In re Arrol), 170 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding the conflicts of laws principles of the applicable state "simply irrelevant").
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restrictive provisions that would render it inapplicable-in whole or in part-
to the debtor and the debtor's property, the Congressional designation of the
state's exemption laws as applicable law should be interpreted to incorporate
those exemptions without the limitations. Here the question is not whether the
state intended its exemptions to have an extraterritorial effect (which it clearly
did not). Instead, the touchstone should be Congressional intent in making
reference to that state law.
Let us return to the hypothetical we just considered. Assume our debtor
moves from State A to State B within 730 days prior to filing for bankruptcy.
Section 522(b)(3)(A) states the debtor's exempt property is the property that is
exempt under the law of State A. Now suppose the exemption laws of State A
provide its exemptions are available only to residents of State A and
exemptions applicable to nonresidents are determined by the exemption laws
of their state of residence. Do the substantive provisions of the exemption law
of State A render the laws of State B applicable to our debtor? The question is
not purely academic. Idaho exemption law includes a provision stating
nonresidents of the state "are entitled to the exemptions provided by the law of
the jurisdiction of their residence" rather than the exemptions provided by
Idaho law. 10 9 Can Idaho exemption law make applicable to the debtor the
exemptions that Congress intended to deny him by inserting the 730-day
limitation? It seems unlikely any court would conclude § 522(b)(3)(A) can be
read to permit this result.
But what if State A does not explicitly direct nonresidents to the exemption
law of the state in which they reside, but merely confines the application of its
own exemption law to its residents or domiciliaries? The result should be the
same. Congress did not intend to allow the state whose exemptions it
incorporated to override the designation by a provision of state law and thereby
put the debtor into exemption-limbo.
When Congress confined a debtor who has moved within 730 days of
bankruptcy to the exemptions he or she would be entitled to under the law of
the state where the debtor was domiciled during the 180 days prior to that 730
days (or the longer part of that 180 days), Congress intended to put the debtor
into the same position as the debtor would have been had the debtor not made
the recent move.' 10 Congress did not intend to punish the debtor for moving
by providing the debtor less favorable exemptions than the debtor would have
109 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-602(1) (2005).
no See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 166 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 215.
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had by staying put; it merely intended to discourage moves for the purpose of
seeking more favorable exemptions prior to a bankruptcy filing. III The
incorporation of state exemptions in § 522(b)(3)(A) should be read as a short-
hand way for Congress to avoid restating the exemption laws of the state from
which the debtor moved, which it clearly had the power to do. If it had
restated those laws in full, it would undoubtedly have excluded any provision
that precluded their applicability to the debtor in question. Its incorporation by
reference should be read to intend the same result.
Put another way, by adopting the opt-out provision, Congress enacted a
federal exemption scheme that incorporates the categories and amounts of
exempt property specified in the law of the applicable state if the state chooses
to opt out. The incorporation was never intended to go further. 112  The
specification of the individual debtor who may take advantage of those
categories and amounts is an issue of federal law, and has been set forth by
Congress in § 522(b)(3)(A). Any restrictive provision included in state law
that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress'' 113 is invalid under the Supremacy
Clause, even if that was not its purpose.
114
The analysis is similar to that undertaken by the Supreme Court in Owen v.
Owen where the issue was the extent to which § 522(b) delegated to the states
control over exemption policy under the Code. 115 Under Florida law, although
homesteads are exempt from judgment liens, liens on the property that attached
before the property became a homestead are excepted.' 16 A Florida debtor
whose homestead was encumbered with a preexisting judgment lien sought to
avoid the lien under § 522(f)(1). The lower courts refused to allow avoidance
of the lien, applying Florida law to the issue.1 17  The Supreme Court
reversed. 
118
111 See generally Cole, supra note 42, at 230-31.
112 Because § 522(b)(2) and (b)(3) looks to state law merely to identify the "property" that is exempt,
rather than deferring to state exemption law generally as had the Bankruptcy Act, those subsections narrow the
scope of deference to state law. See Morris Stem, State Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor
as a Medium for Appraising Aspects of Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 70, 93-94 (1980).
113 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
114 See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
115 500 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1991).
116 Id. at 307.
117 Id. at 307-08.
118 Id. at 314.
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The judgment creditor argued when Florida exemptions are used in a
bankruptcy case by virtue of the opt-out provision, they must be used subject
to all limitations imposed by Florida law. 119 Therefore, the exemption the
debtor would enjoy under Florida law was not impaired by the preexisting
judgment lien, and § 522(f)(1) should not be available to avoid it.
120
The Supreme Court first concluded § 522(f) could certainly be used to
avoid liens that impaired federal exemptions, even when there was no equity in
the purportedly exempt property because of the lien at issue. 12 1 The question
was whether § 522(f) should be interpreted differently when the applicable
exemptions were state-created rather than federal because of the opt-out
clause. 122  The Court noted § 522(f) begins with the language
"[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions," which it interpreted to mean
that it was intended to override a waiver that would have been effective under
state law.123 It continued,
Just as it is not inconsistent with the policy of permitting state-
defined exemptions to have another policy disfavoring waiver of
exemptions, whether federal- or state-created; so also it is not
inconsistent to have a policy disfavoring the impingement of certain
types of liens upon exemptions, whether federal- or state-created.
We have no basis for pronouncing the opt-out policy absolute, but
must apply it along with whatever other competing or limiting
policies the statute contains.124
As a result, if the requirements of § 522(f)(1) were met, it would allow the
avoidance of a lien despite its validity under state law.
125
The designation of the state whose exemptions are to apply to the recently
departed debtor in § 522(b)(3) also represents a considered policy judgment of
Congress. As was true in Owen, the opt-out provision can be given effect by
using the substantive exemptions provided under state law, even while refusing
"9 Id. at 309.
120 id.
121 Id. at 312.
122 Id. at 313.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 314. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the debtor could not avoid the lien under
§ 522(f)(1) in any event because the judgment was recorded prior to the acquisition of the property by the
debtor. As a result, the debtor never had a property interest in the homestead prior to the "'fixing of the lien,"
which might be subject to avoidance under § 522(f)(1). Owen v. Owen (In re Owen), 961 F.2d 170, 171 (11 th
Cir. 1992).
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to apply the state-created limitations on applicability of those exemptions
because those limitations conflict with federal bankruptcy policy. 1
26
CONCLUSION
If Congress had wished to do so, it could have provided in the Code that
debtors who moved from one state to another within a certain number of days
of bankruptcy (730, for example), are confined to the federal exemptions
provided by § 522(d), notwithstanding any decision on opt-out by the location
of their prior domicile or their new domicile. Given our peripatetic population,
perhaps such an approach would be one more small step towards uniform
federal exemptions, which many scholars have supported, 127 and which the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended in its 1997 Report. 28
But the Code does not so provide. Section 522(b)(2) explicitly gives effect
to the decision of the state whose law it makes applicable to opt out of the
federal scheme. That decision of a state to decline to authorize election of the
federal exemptions is itself intended to be binding on those who are subject to
the state's exemption laws. A state has no interest, or indeed power, to decide
whether someone who is not subject to its exemption laws can elect to apply
them. In § 522(b)(2), however, Congress made that state decision to opt out
applicable to a debtor to whom the state itself would find the law inapplicable.
There is no doubt about the power of Congress to do so under its constitutional
authority to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. 1
29
Similarly, Congress has the power to make the substantive content of state
exemptions applicable to debtors under circumstances where the state would
decline contradictory to do so. That is precisely what § 522(b)(3)(A) was
intended to do. It would be anomalous to read § 522(b)(2) to make applicable
to the non-domiciliary the state law on opt-out while reading § 522(b)(3)(A) to
126 See Bruin Portfolio, L.L.C. v. Leicht (In re Leicht), 222 B.R. 670 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998); In re Betz,
273 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (finding preemption of provisions of Massachusetts homestead law
by Code). See generally Lee Robert Bogdanoff, Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Code: Using California's
New Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 922 (1984) (examining whether substantive
provisions of the Code affect applicability of various provisions of California's homestead law in bankruptcy);
Michael Terry Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
339, 351-53 (1980) (arguing limitations in state exemption laws to "citizens" would be ineffective under
§ 522(b) because the Code intends all debtors be provided exemptions).
127 See supra note 39.
128 See supra note 40.
129 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 4.
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permit the same state to make its exemption laws inapplicable to the non-
domiciliary now confined to those exemptions. If this were the appropriate
reading, any state could undercut the requirements of § 522(b)(3)(A) simply by
providing explicitly in its exemption statutes that they apply only to residents
or to property physically located in the state (as some states have done).' 30  If
all states enacted such provisions, the debtor who moved within 730 days of
bankruptcy would have no exemptions at all.
In response to this concern,' 31 Congress inserted a new provision in
§ 522(b)(3) in the 2005 amendments to that section. After listing the property
subject to exemption in paragraphs (A) through (C), Congress inserted a new
sentence that reads: "If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under
subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the
130 For example, among the states that limit their homestead exemptions to "residents" of, persons
"domiciled" in, or "citizens" of the state are Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (2005); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1101 (2005); Arkansas, ARK. CONST. art. 9 §§ 3-5 and ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-210 (2006);
Indiana, IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2 (2005); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060 (West 2005); Mississippi,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21, -23 (2005); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-606, -615 (2005); North
Carolina, N.C. CONST. art. X § 2 and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(l) (2005); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.66(A)(l)(b) (West 2006); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, §§ 31-1(A)(1), 31-3 (2005); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(1) (2004); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-1 (2006); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1, 34-4 (2005); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 815.20 (2005); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT.
ANN. 1-20-101 (2005). Other homestead exemptions explicitly cover only property within the state's
geographic boundaries. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-92(a) (2005); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(d)
(Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-3(2)(a) (2005). Some states also limit the applicability of their
personal property exemptions to residents or domiciliaries. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-5, -6; IND. CODE § 34-
55-10-2; IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2304 (2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 427.010(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-606, -608, -609; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (2006); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 42-10-10 (West 2005); N.C. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-22-15(5) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 31-1(A); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-41-30; TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-103, -104 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-4, 34-4, 34-26.
131 The issue was first raised by Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, in a letter, dated April 19, 1999, to Representative Hyde of the
Committee of the Judiciary. The letter provided comments on H.R. 833, which was then before the Committee
for mark-up. Although endorsing the proposal in section 126 of the bill that would allow the debtor who had
not been domiciled in a state for 730 days prior to filing to claim exemptions under the law of the state where
the debtor was previously domiciled, Mr. Burke expressed the Department's concern that the provision might
not be "effective." The letter continued:
Much of this will depend on how states limit their exemptions or permit individuals to claim
exemptions. Without a full understanding of how state exemption laws are applied, unintended
gaps will still arise under this proposal as debtors attempt to claim exemptions under the laws of
another state in which they no longer reside or have property. It is unlikely, for example, that a
Missouri debtor could claim the Texas homestead for the debtor's new Missouri residence-two
years after the debtor has moved himself and his property from Texas-thus leaving the debtor
with no homestead exemption to claim.
H.R. REP. No. 106-123, p.1, at 201 (1999).
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debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection (d)."' 132
But this "fix" was neither necessary nor sufficient.
The fix was unnecessary because, as discussed in Part III above, the
language of § 522(b)(3)(A) should be read to incorporate the applicable state's
exemptions without regard to any conflict of laws principles, or any limiting
language, that restricts the applicability of the exemptions to persons not
including the debtor. If § 522(b)(3)(A) were analyzed under traditional choice
of law principles, its requirements would never render the debtor ineligible for
the applicable state exemptions, and therefore the debtor would always have
exemptions available.' 33 The new language should never be applicable.
The fix was insufficient because many states do not limit the availability of
all their exemptions. Assume for purposes of this discussion that by including
the new language Congress intended to indicate restrictive provisions in the
applicable state law confining state exemptions to persons not including the
debtor are to be given effect. Unless the restrictive provisions apply to every
category of state exemption, the debtor will still be denied the benefit of the
federal exemptions. For example, the state law may protect only homestead
property within the boundaries of the state from execution while imposing no
restriction on personal property exemptions. The restrictive language would
preclude a nonresident from claiming a homestead exemption while permitting
use of other state categories. If Congress intended in such circumstances to
permit the debtor to elect the federal homestead exemption,' 34 the language
included in § 522(b)(3) does not accomplish that result. So long as applicable
132 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23,
section 307, codified at II U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (2005).
133 Again, this is a different analysis than would prevail under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in which
Congress did not purport to "affect" existing state exemption law. See supra text accompanying note 21.
Because Congress did not enact any exemptions as a matter of federal legislation in the Act, a debtor who was
not entitled to exemptions under the applicable state law (or who had no U.S. domicile) could be denied
exemptions completely. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 30, at 1481-82; Countryman, supra
note 28, at 696 n. 118.
134 The homestead exemption certainly was the focus of the Department of Justice comments on the
provision that gave rise to the new language. See supra note 131.
It is possible Congress did not intend this result. The House Report describes the provision as follows,
"If the effect of this provision [§ 522(b)(3)(A)] is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor
may elect to exempt property of the kind described in the Federal exemption notwithstanding the state has
opted out of the Federal exemption allowances." H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. I, at 72, as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 140 (emphasis added). The italicized language suggests an item-by-item determination of
whether a category of exemption is available to a debtor. If the category is not available, the language
suggests the federal "exemption" (not "exemptions") could be used. The enacted law instead refers generally
to property specified under § 522(d).
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state law in the opt-out state permits the debtor any exemption, even if it denies
the debtor others, the debtor is not allowed to elect federal exemptions.
The compromise of the opt-out in the Code represents to many a triumph of
states' rights over creeping federalism. But the triumph is limited in scope.
Congress did not decline to legislate with respect to exemptions, as it had
under the Bankruptcy Act. Instead, Congress made state law exemptions
applicable as a matter of federal law. Interpretation of that federal law, using
general principles of choice of law, compels the conclusion that Congress
deferred to the states with respect to the content of those exemptions, but not as
to their applicability. When § 522(b)(3)(A) makes state exemptions applicable
to a debtor who has moved from the designated state, the state can not say nay.
